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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

No. 72-1589

VIOLA N. RICHARDSON, as County Clerk and Registrar of Voters for the County of Mendocino, Individually and as a representative of the class of all other County Clerks and Registrars of Voters, *Petitioner,*

VS.

ABRAN RAMIREZ, LARRY GILL and ALBERT LEE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, LOS PINTOS, 7th STEP FOUNDATION, INC., (CALIFORNIA AFFILIATES), PRISONERS' UNION, and THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, *Respondents.*

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of California

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Respondents, ABRAN RAMIREZ, LARRY GILL, and ALBERT LEE, individually and on behalf of a class of over 100,000 previously disfranchised Cali-

fornia electors, respectfully pray, for the reasons expressed herein, that the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied. The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by petitioner, a California County Registrar of Voters, seeking to reverse a unanimous judgment by the California Supreme Court in *Ramirez v. Brown,* 9 Cal.3d 199 (1973), restoring the right to vote to certain ex-felons in California.[1]

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the denial of the right to vote, through the unequal application of California's voting laws, violates the principles of equal protection.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Article II, Section 3 of the California Constitution denies suffrage to those who have been convicted of "infamous crimes".[2] In 1966, the California Supreme Court interpreted Article II, Section 1 and related constitutional and statutory provisions to exclude from the voting rolls those persons who had been convicted of crimes which threatened "the purity of the ballot box". *Otsuka v. Hite,* 64 Cal.2d 596 (1966).

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[1]Respondents below were California's Secretary of State, represented by California's Attorney General, and all 58 County Registrars. Petitioner herein is one of those County Registrars, the Registrar of Mendocino County.

[2]In the November, 1972 general election, Article II, Section 1 of the California Constitution was re-enacted by referendum as Article II, Section 3.

Since that time, California's 58 Registrars of Voters have established 58 separate and often inconsistent policies as to which of California's several hundred felonies were "infamous crimes" and which were not.

Respondents, RAMIREZ, GILL, and LEE, sought an original writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court on behalf of themselves and those California ex-felons whom they represented[3] to require California's Chief Election Officer, the Secretary of State, and all of California's 58 County Registrars to register those ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired.[4] The original jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court was invoked because of the state-wide impact of the questions involved and the then impending national elections. *Ramirez, supra,* at 202-203.

Respondents presented the California Supreme Court with data showing the state-wide geographical disparities in application of the "infamous crime" standard. In reviewing the evidence presented, the California Supreme Court held in a unanimous decision that the disfranchisement of ex-felons who were not then incarcerated or on parole was no longer constitutionally permissible in California. *Ramirez v. Brown, supra.*

---

[3]Other named Respondents are three non-profit organizations whose members are directly adversely affected by ex-felon disfranchisement, and the California League of Women Voters, a non-profit California corporation whose purpose is to promote active citizen participation in government.

[4]As requested by petitioners below, the opinion in *Ramirez* is specifically limited to those ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole have been completed. 9 Cal.3d at 217, n. 18.

ARGUMENT

I

CALIFORNIA'S ELECTION PRACTICES, HISTORY AND PRIOR COURT RULINGS LED TO A CHAOTIC SITUATION WHICH REQUIRED THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT TO REASSESS THE DISFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS IN THAT STATE.

A. The California Supreme Court, Faced With A Pattern Of Unequal Application Of The Vague "Infamous Crime" Standard, Decided The Issue In This Case On A Series Of Facts Unique To California.

Under the California Constitution as interpreted in *Otsuka v. Hite,* 64 Cal.2d 596 (1966), each of California's 58 County Registrars individually decided which crimes were "infamous" so as to bar their perpetrators from the voting lists. Pursuant to his responsibilities to apply election laws in a uniform manner, California's Secretary of State conducted a survey in early 1972 of the registration practices of California's 58 County Registrars. The results of this survey clearly show that the term "infamous crime" was interpreted by each County Registrar on an ad hoc basis and resulted in a hodge podge of rules and standards. A chart indicating the results of the Secretary's survey appears in the Appendix hereto, but the following are clear examples of the geographical disparity in the application of California's election laws that existed at the time respondents petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief:

> [A] A person convicted of burglary who had been released from prison and parole was registered and permitted to vote if he lived in Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Marin, San Joaquin,

Sonoma, or Yuba Counties. He was denied registration if he lived in El Dorado, San Bernardino, or Santa Cruz Counties.

[B] Similarly, at least eight counties (Yolo, Sonoma, Santa Clara, San Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento, Contra Costa, and Alameda) would have registered a robbery ex-felon whereas seven others (Siskiyou, Santa Cruz, San Joaquin, San Bernardino, Orange, Monterey, and Los Angeles) would not.

[C] Twenty-one counties indicated they would register an ex-felon convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, but Butte and San Joaquin would not. San Bernardino would register one convicted of possession but not one convicted of use. Orange, San Bernardino, and Santa Cruz would register one convicted of possession or use but not sale of drugs. At least nine of the others register all three.

[D] Butte County indicated that it would not register a person convicted of drunk driving causing death but would register one convicted of wife beating. San Bernardino would not register one convicted of "sex charges" but would register an ex-felon convicted of child molesting. San Diego County would register one convicted of first degree murder but not one convicted of non-support. Los Angeles County would not register an ex-felon whose crime was statutory rape but apparently would register one who was guilty of forcible rape. Santa Clara permitted registration

if the crime was prostitution, but San Bernardino would not.

[E] Several counties registered those convicted of embezzling, forgery, or insufficient funds. (Alameda, Colusa, Contra Costa, Marin, Riverside, Sacramento, Santa Clara and San Francisco). Santa Clara would register one convicted of income tax evasion but Los Angeles would not. San Joaquin registered one convicted of transporting counterfeiting tools but denied the franchise to another guilty of issuing bad checks.

[F] The responses of Sonoma and San Joaquin Counties indicated that they had a "two-conviction" rule. There, persons convicted of two non-infamous crimes, such as assault and armed robbery, would be refused registration because two non-infamous crimes were apparently equivalent to one infamous crime.

Thus, the total lack of uniformity in the application of California's election laws had resulted in the choice of a county of residence being the deciding factor in respondents' efforts to register and vote.[5] The practice of each California county to treat the enfranchisement of ex-felons differently was brought squarely before the Court below. These inconsisten-

[5]At the time of the Secretary of State's survey, petitioner Viola Richardson, Mendocino County's Registrar, had no written guidelines for determination of which former felons were eligible to register. An ex-felon who attempted to register was told to make an appointment to discuss his case with the local district attorney. (Exhibit "D" to petition below).

cies showed that the "infamous crime" disqualification, as expounded by *Otsuka, supra,* was not susceptible of an even-handed, uniform application by California's County Registrars. The California Supreme Court's construction of the "infamous crime" provision to include some but not all ex-felons (In *Otsuka, supra*) and the disparities in application which followed are facts which restrict the applicability of the decision below to California. The principles indicated therein do not necessarily conflict with decisions rendered by other courts, in other states, in different circumstances.

B. The Decision Below Rests Heavily Upon The Singular History Of California's Election Laws And Practices And The Present Day Statutory Scheme To Safeguard Against Election Fraud.

Prior to *Otsuka v. Hite, supra,* all persons convicted of an "infamous crime" were prohibited from registering and voting in California. The rationale for such disfranchisement lay in the history of California's voting laws and practices. From its inception, California restricted the franchise. California's Constitutional Convention adopted the "infamous crime" exclusion in 1849. Browne, *Debates in the Convention of California,* 75, 481 (1850). Records of early California elections indicate that Californians may have justifiably feared that unscrupulous individuals would corrupt the electoral process.[6]

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[6]"By custom, the ballot box was any sort of paltry cubical container found lying about the neighborhood. In San Francisco's first municipal election under American auspices, in 1846, they used an empty crate that had held flasks of lemon syrup. Down at the

The California Supreme Court recognized both this historical background and the evolution of California's voting practices into an orderly, regulated institution. *Ramirez v. Brown,* at 212-214, n. 11, 12.[7] In fact, the Court found that voting fraud in California today is not a realistic possibility nor a valid rationale for a blanket disfranchisement of ex-felons:

> "Taken together, these and other reforms of the past hundred years have radically diminished the possibility of election fraud in California. The voting and counting process is now thoroughly hemmed in by control mechanisms at every stage, so that deliberate irregularities, if present today, are rare and have negligible effects on election results. (Note (1967) 14 U.C. L.A. L.Rev. 699, 702 (reporting that the Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters had received no complaints of this type for the previous 41 years).) In sum, it may have been feasible in 1850 to influence the outcome of an election by rounding up the impecunious and the thirsty,

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Pueblo de Nuestra Senora La Reina de Los Angeles, known to the Yankees as 'Loss Anjeluss', it was a candle box perched on the window ledge of an adobe shack. And in Vallejo, up the Bay from San Francisco, the election officers simply trotted out the same old cracker box, year after year, until someone discovered that one of the judges was tucking supplementary ballots through a knothole in the back. These vulnerable, virgin ballot boxes, crude as they were, attracted hordes of eager citizens, some of whom came to vote not once but several times. There was no register; the ballots were not numbered; and every man was encouraged to exercise his franchise, whether he was entitled to it or not. Even the crews of two French men-of-war voted in one San Francisco election." Reinhardt, *Tapeworm Tickets and Shoulder Strikers,* 3 *American West* 34, 37 (Western History Association Quarterly) 1966.

[7]While some states may indeed have valid problems concerning election fraud, California is not one. The last reported case of vote buying in California occurred in 1908. *Bush v. Head,* 154 C. 277, (1908).

furnishing them with free liquor, premarked ballots, and transportation to the polls; to do so in 1973, if possible at all, would require the coordinated skills of a vast squadron of computer technicians. [Footnote omitted]" 9 Cal.3d at 214.

A similar development in the penal sanctions of California's election laws led the Court below to the finding that adequate statutory deterrents to fraud were available in California:

"The first election law denominated only eight offenses against the franchise, and all were punishable as misdemeanors. (Stats. 1850, ch. 38, pp. 110-111, §§98-105). Today, in sharp contrast, the Elections Code punishes at least 76 different acts as felonies, in 33 separate sections; at least 60 additional acts are punished as misdemeanors, in 40 separate sections; and 14 more acts are declared to be felony-misdemeanors [Footnote omitted] . . . These sanctions are even more pervasive than those characterized by the Supreme Court in *Dunn* as 'more than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared' [citation]." 9 Cal.3d at 215-216.

The California Supreme Court's review of and reliance upon California's historical and current election laws and practices emphasizes the unique position of this case. Again, that court's decision does not conflict with opinions rendered in other states having different election law histories and statutory schemes.[8]

[8]In fact, the trend is toward an elimination of the restrictions on former-felons voting. At the time of filing the petition below, forty percent of the states either did not disfranchise those convicted of a felony (four states), only disqualify those convicted of

II

IN VIEW OF THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT BELOW, THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT DISFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS IN CALIFORNIA IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

State statutes that restrict the right to vote must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest. *Dunn v. Blumstein,* 405 U.S. 330 (1972), *Bullock v. Carter,* 405 U.S. 134 (1972), *Kramer v. Union Free School District,* 395 U.S. 621 (1969).[9] This constitutional standard was not disputed by any of the parties below nor is it questioned by petitioner, the Mendocino County Registrar.

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an election code violation (two states) or provided an automatic restoration of civil rights upon completion of sentence (fifteen states). The twenty-one states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. (Appendix "B" to petition below).

[9]In 1969, this Court held in *Kramer v. Union Free School District,* 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), that non-parents could not be denied the franchise in school district elections because such an exclusion was not "necessary to promote a compelling state interest". In *Bullock v. Carter,* 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the Court struck down a Texas primary election filing fee system. The Court found that although there was a valid state interest involved, "other means to protect those valid interests are available". 405 U.S. at 146. Decided in the same term was *Dunn v. Blumstein,* 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In *Dunn,* the Court considered a Tennessee residence qualification and held that Tennessee had adequate procedural safeguards and penal sanctions available to "preserve the purity of the ballot box". 405 U.S. at 346. In the case decided below, the California Supreme Court considered present election laws and practices in California and found: "For the reasons stated in *Dunn,* we hold that the enforcement of modern [California] statutes regulating the voting process and penalizing its misuse—rather than outright disfranchisement of persons convicted of crime—is today the method of preventing election fraud which is the least burdensome on the right of suffrage. It follows that such disfranchisement is not 'necessary' within the meaning of *Dunn* and its predecessors, to achieve that goal." *Ramirez v. Brown, supra* at 216.

Rather, petitioner argues that—conceding that there is no compelling interest in California for disfranchising former felons—California may nevertheless deny the right to vote to ex-felons because of the language of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Section 2 of that Amendment provides for reduction of representation in the Congress when a state denies the franchise to 21 year old male residents of the state, "except for participation in rebellion or other crime". In support of her contention, the Mendocino County Registrar states at page ten of her Petition, "It has been consistently held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the states to disenfranchise for crime", citing *Davis v. Beason,* 133 U.S. 333 (1890), *Trop v. Dulles,* 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and *Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,* 365 U.S. 45 (1959).

To put it charitably, reliance upon these three cases is misleading. Nowhere in the text of the decision in *Davis v. Beason, supra,* is Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment even mentioned. Nor did the case deal with ex-felon voting. Mr. Justice Field begins the opinion of the Court with the following statement:

> "On this appeal our only inquiry is whether the district court of the territory had jurisdiction of the offense charged in the indictment, of which the defendant was found guilty [Registering to vote although a Mormon]. If it had jurisdiction, we can go no further. We cannot look into any alleged errors in its rulings, on the trial of the defendant. The writ of *habeas corpus* cannot be turned into a writ of error to review the action of that court." 133 U.S. at 341.

In fact, *Davis, supra,* dealt with an Idaho territorial statute denying the right to vote to bigamists or polygamists who taught or counselled others to become bigamists or polygamists. The Court considered whether an act of Congress also dealing with polygamists voting conflicted with the territorial statute and held that it did not. Petitioner has misconstrued the case with the aid of four ellipses eliminating all reference to polygamy and bigamy, while leaving in statutory sections not in fact under consideration by the Court.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the second case relied upon by petitioner for the proposition that this Court has "consistently held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the states to disenfranchise for crime", also makes absolutely no reference to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Trop, supra,* involved a statute that prescribed loss of citizenship as punishment for conviction by court-martial of wartime desertion. This Court held that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In the third case, *Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,* 365 U.S. 45 (1959), this Court upheld a North Carolina statute and constitutional provision that made literacy a voter registration prerequisite. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment *is* mentioned in the opinion but was cited only for the proposition that the "right to vote" is not absolute and may be, within reason, regulated by the states. 365 U.S. at 51. This Court made no holding or com-

ment whatever concerning the impact of Section 2 on persons disfranchised for crime.

Contrary to petitioner's claims, this Court has declined to give weight to the contention that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment somehow affects or controls the ambit of the equal protection clause as it is applied to the right to vote.

In *Oregon v. Mitchell,* 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970), *Carrington v. Rash,* 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965), and *Reynolds v. Sims,* 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964), Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, urged that this Court give Section 2 the almost identical construction now urged by petitioner. In each case this Court did not do so. In fact, the Court in *Oregon* upheld a federal law passed pursuant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment preventing the states from denying the franchise in federal elections to those persons eighteen years of age despite the specific language of Section 2 stating that no penalty shall be suffered by the states for denial of suffrage to persons under twenty-one years of age.

As stated by the court in *Stephens v. Yeomans,* 327 F.Supp. 1182 at 1185, (1970), in holding a New Jersey ex-felon disfranchising provision unconstitutional:

> "In his dissenting opinion in *Reynolds v. Sims,* 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), Justice Harlan outlined the analytical and historical argument that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to apply to state voting qualification laws.

He pointed to the express language in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as to interpretations contemporaneous with the adoption of that Amendment. The defendant also relied on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But Justice Harlan's view has not prevailed, and it is now established that a state voter classification disfranchising resident citizens must pass equal protection muster under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Certiorari should be denied.

Dated, July 19, 1973.

Respectfully submitted,

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Migrant Legal Action Program,
Attorneys for Respondents.

DONALD G. GREEN,
SARA E. GREEN,
League of Women Voters
Education Fund,
Of Counsel.

(Appendix Follows)


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MERCED		Unclear					
MODOC		Unclear					
MONO			Yes				
MONTEREY	2/						
NAPA		Unclear					
NEVADA		Unclear					
ORANGE			Yes-m		No		No
PLACER		Unclear					
RIVERSIDE	5/		Yes-m				No--public
SAN BENITO	2/	Unclear					
SAN BERNARDINO			Yes	No	No	Yes - felony	
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SAN DIEGO	6/		Yes				No
SAN FRANCISCO	1/	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No--public
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VENTURA			Yes				
YOLO		No	Yes				

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LAKE	Must receive pardon							
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MADERA	Unclear							
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ORANGE				No		Yes		No-armed
PLACER	Unclear							
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SAN BERNARDINO			No		No/2nd deg.			No
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SAN FRANCISCO		Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
SAN JOAQUIN			No					No-armed
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TUOLUMNE				No				
VENTURA								
YOLO			No	No			No	Yes



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AMADOR	Unclear						
BUTTE							
CALAVERAS							
COLUSA							
CONTRA COSTA		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DEL NORTE				Yes 3/			
EL DORADO				No	No		
FRESNO				Yes			
GLENN	Unclear						
IMPERIAL						No	
KERN							No
KINGS	Unclear						
LAKE	Must receive pardon						
LASSEN							
LOS ANGELES					No		No
MADERA	Unclear						
MARIN				Yes			
MENDOCINO	Unclear						
MERCED	Unclear						
MODOC	Unclear						
MONO							
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NAPA	Unclear						
NEVADA	Unclear						
ORANGE							
PLACER	Unclear						
RIVERSIDE		Yes-Aggr.	Yes				
SAN BENITO	Unclear						
SAN BERNARDINO		Yes		No			
SACRAMENTO		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
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IMPERIAL								
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KINGS	Unclear							
LAKE	Must receive pardon							
LASSEN								
LOS ANGELES		No	No	No	No	No	No	No
MADERA	Unclear							
MARIN					Yes			
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MONO								
MONTEREY		No						
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ORANGE								
PLACER	Unclear							
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SACRAMENTO		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
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SAN FRANCISCO		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAN JOAQUIN			No	No		No		No
SANTA BARBARA					Yes			
SAN MATEO		No		No				
SANTA CLARA		No			Yes	Yes		Yes
SANTA CRUZ		No	No	No				No
SHASTA	Unclear							
SISKIYOU								
SOLANO				No				
SONOMA								
TEHAMA	Unclear							
TULARE	Unclear							
TUOLUMNE		No						
VENTURA								
YOLO		No			Yes			
YUBA								

ALAMEDA		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ALPINE	Unclear						
AMADOR	Unclear						
BUTTE							
CALAVERAS							
COLUSA							
CONTRA COSTA		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DEL NORTE							
EL DORADO							
FRESNO							
GLENN	Unclear						
IMPERIAL							
KERN							
KINGS	Unclear						
LAKE	Must receive pardon						
LASSEN							
LOS ANGELES		No	No				
MADERA	Unclear						
MARIN				Yes	Yes		
MENDOCINO	Unclear						
MERCED	Unclear						
MODOC	Unclear						
MONO							
MONTEREY					Yes		
NAPA	Unclear						
NEVADA	Unclear						
ORANGE							
PLACER	Unclear						
RIVERSIDE							
SAN BENITO	Unclear						
SAN BERNARDINO			Yes			No	No
SACRAMENTO		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAN DIEGO			Yes		Yes		Yes
SAN FRANCISCO		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAN JOAQUIN			No				
SANTA BARBARA							
SAN MATEO							
SANTA CLARA		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
SANTA CRUZ							
SHASTA	Unclear						
SISKIYOU							
SOLANO							
SONOMA							
TEHAMA	Unclear						
TULARE	Unclear						
TUOLUMNE		No					
VENTURA							Yes
YOLO					Yes		
YUBA							

ALAMEDA		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Maj
ALPINE	Unclear							
AMADOR	Unclear							
BUTTE								
CALAVERAS								
COLUSA								
CONTRA COSTA		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DEL NORTE								
EL DORADO								
FRESNO								
GLENN	Unclear							
IMPERIAL								
KERN								
KINGS	Unclear							
LAKE	Must receive pardon							
LASSEN								
LOS ANGELES								
MADERA	Unclear							
MARIN								
MENDOCINO	Unclear							
MERCED	Unclear							
MODOC	Unclear							
MONO								
MONTEREY								
NAPA	Unclear							
NEVADA	Unclear							
ORANGE								
PLACER	Unclear							
RIVERSIDE								
SAN BENITO	Unclear							
SAN BERNARDINO		No						
SACRAMENTO		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAN DIEGO			No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
SAN FRANCISCO		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAN JOAQUIN			No					Yes
SANTA BARBARA								
SAN MATEO								
SANTA CLARA		Yes					Yes	
SANTA CRUZ			No					
SHASTA	Unclear							
SISKIYOU								
SOLANO								
SONOMA								
TEHAMA	Unclear							
TULARE	Unclear							
TUOLUMNE								
VENTURA								
YOLO								

ALAMEDA		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ALPINE	Unclear					
AMADOR	Unclear					
BUTTE						
CALAVERAS						
COLUSA						
CONTRA COSTA		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DEL NORTE						
EL DORADO						
FRESNO						
GLENN	Unclear					
IMPERIAL						
KERN						
KINGS	Unclear					
LAKE	Must receive pardon					
LASSEN						
LOS ANGELES			Yes-m			Yes
MADERA	Unclear					
MARIN						
MENDOCINO	Unclear					
MERCED	Unclear					
MODOC	Unclear					
MONO						
MONTEREY						
NAPA	Unclear					
NEVADA	Unclear					
ORANGE						
PLACER	Unclear					
RIVERSIDE						
SAN BENITO	Unclear					
SAN BERNARDINO			Yes			
SACRAMENTO		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAN DIEGO						
SAN FRANCISCO		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SAN JOAQUIN		Yes	Yes			
SANTA BARBARA				No		
SAN MATEO			Yes-m	No	No	
SANTA CLARA			Yes	Yes		
SANTA CRUZ				No	No	
SHASTA	Unclear					
SISKIYOU						
SOLANO			Yes	Yes		
SONOMA				(Attempt)		
TEHAMA	Unclear					
TULARE	Unclear					
TUOLUMNE						
VENTURA						
YOLO						

		Extortion Yes	Footnotes
ALAMEDA			
ALPINE	Unclear		1/ Indicates "all others are registered".
AMADOR	Unclear		2/ Any person placed on probation who does not
BUTTE			actually serve time will be registered.
CALAVERAS			3/ One person convicted of second degree burglary,
COLUSA			given a suspended sentence and probation, was permitted to
CONTRA COSTA		Yes	register.
DEL NORTE			4/ Their standard is non-registration of persons who
EL DORADO			"constitute a practical threat to the elective process and
FRESNO			no alternative exists that will protect the elective pro-
GLENN	Unclear		cess".
IMPERIAL			5/ "Our position generally has been on the lenient
KERN			side to restore the right of the individual to vote".
KINGS	Unclear		6/ "Crimes of violence felons" may register.
LAKE	Must receive pardon		7/ Apparently an ex-felon convicted of assault and
LASSEN			armed robbery was denied while an ex-felon convicted of
LOS ANGELES			burglary and assault with a deadly weapon was permitted
MADERA	Unclear		to register.
MARIN			8/ Was denied for combination of assault and grand
MENDOCINO	Unclear		larceny.
MERCED	Unclear		9/ Incorporated in their definition of "infamous
MODOC	Unclear		crime" the list sets out in West's California Digest.
MONO			Vol. 21, Words and Phrases at 539.
MONTEREY			
NAPA	Unclear		
NEVADA	Unclear		
ORANGE			
PLACER	Unclear		
RIVERSIDE		Yes	
SAN BENITO	Unclear		
SAN BERNARDINO			
SACRAMENTO		Yes	
SAN DIEGO			
SAN FRANCISCO		Yes	
SAN JOAQUIN			
SANTA BARBARA			
SAN MATEO			
SANTA CLARA			
SANTA CRUZ			
SHASTA	Unclear		
SISKIYOU			
SOLANO			
SONOMA			
TEHAMA	Unclear		
TULARE	Unclear		
TUOLUMNE			
VENTURA			
YOLO			
YUBA			